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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Following the debt crises of the 1980s, sovereign debt defaults have become more frequent. 
Episodes of outright default include Russia, Ecuador, Argentina; in other cases, formal 
default was avoided via a debt restructuring under a coercive threat of default as in Ukraine, 
Pakistan, and Uruguay; and in other cases, default was averted through large scale IMF 
financial support as in Mexico, Brazil, and Turkey. 
 
While there has been a significant amount of research regarding debt crises in general, and 
about the policy responses to these sovereign defaults,
2 the macroeconomic and structural 
weaknesses leading to them are still not properly understood; there is little comparative 
empirical work on the sovereign debt crises of the last decade. Many policymakers and 
analysts continue to use simple rules of thumb to judge risks and to assess fiscal 
sustainability (IMF, 2003), as well as the soundness of macroeconomic policies. Too often, 
these rules are not based on a rigorous quantitative analysis, and may miss some core 
elements that led to these sovereign debt crises.  
 
Our aim is to provide answers to the following basic questions. What set of economic and 
political conditions is empirically associated with a likely occurrence of a sovereign debt 
crisis? Can one derive thresholds for vulnerability indicators that may signal a higher 
likelihood of a sovereign debt crisis? Part of the motivation for the paper stems from so-
called surveillance failures, namely cases where international financial institutions, such as 
the IMF, as well as rating agencies, private sector agents, and academics failed to correctly 
assess the likelihood of a sovereign default. 
 
In the paper, we use a new statistical approach and derive a set of “rules of thumb” that help 
identify the typical characteristics of defaulters. In the process, we identify empirically 
different typologies of debt crises. We find that not all crises are equal: they differ depending 
on whether the government faced insolvency, illiquidity, or various macroeconomic 
weaknesses and risks. This classification is crucial for discussing appropriate policy options 
for preventing crises and responding to them once they occur. For example, it is often argued 
that solvent but illiquid countries with large amounts of short-term debt may need IMF 
support to avoid a liquidity run or “roll-off” crisis. Conversely, highly indebted countries 
may face a debt crisis, unless there is a strong and credible fiscal consolidation. Also, it is 
argued that conditionality should set targets indicating that a country’s macroeconomic 
fundamentals are heading towards a relatively “safe” zone. In the paper these concepts of 
liquidity crisis, insolvency crisis, crises triggered by weak macrofundamentals, and relatively 
“safe zones” are made precise. Unless the diagnosis is correct, it is hard to get the policy cure 
right.  
 
                                                 
2 See for example Roubini and Setser (2004) for a systematic analysis of the crises in emerging market 
economies in the last decade, and on how they were resolved. - 4 - 
This empirical analysis is based on a dataset containing annual observations for 47 emerging 
market economies from 1970 to 2002. A country is defined to be in a “debt crisis” if it is 
classified as being in default by Standard & Poor’s, or if it receives a large nonconcessional 
IMF loan (where “large” means in excess of 100 percent of quota). Standard & Poor’s rates 
sovereign issuers in default when a government fails to meet principal or interest payment on 
an external obligation on due date (including exchange offers, debt equity swaps, and buy 
back for cash).  
 
We employ the Binary Recursive Tree methodology (BRT) for classification and prediction.
3 
BRT is a computer-intensive data mining technique that selects explanatory variables, their 
critical values, and their interactions in order to identify “safe” from “crisis-prone” types. 
The main conclusions of our empirical analysis are as follows. 
  
First, out of 50 candidate variables, 10 predictor variables turn out to be sufficient for 
classification and prediction: total external debt/GDP ratio; short-term debt reserves ratio; 
real GDP growth; public external debt/fiscal revenue ratio; CPI inflation; number of years to 
the next presidential election; U.S. treasury bills rate; external financial requirements (current 
account balance plus short-term debt as a ratio of foreign reserves); exchange rate 
overvaluation; and exchange rate volatility.  
 
Second, a relatively “safe” country type is described by a handful of economic prerequisites: 
low total external debt (below 49.7 percent of GDP); low short-term debt (below 130 percent 
of reserves); low public external debt (below 214 percent of fiscal revenue); and an exchange 
rate that is not excessively overappreciated (overvaluation below 48 percent). 
 
Third, three major types of risks are identified: (i) solvency (or debt unsustainability); 
(ii) illiquidity; and (iii) macroexchange rate risks. The debt unsustainability risk types are 
characterized by: external debt in excess of 49.7 percent of GDP, and together with monetary 
or fiscal imbalances, as well as large external financing needs that signal illiquidity as an 
element of debt unsustainability. Liquidity risk types are identified by moderate debt levels, 
but with short-term debt in excess of 130 percent of reserves coupled with political 
uncertainty and tight international capital markets. Macroexchange rate risk types arise from 
the combination of low growth and relatively fixed exchange rates. Each of these risk types 
differ in their likelihood of producing a crisis. 
The analysis has one important, albeit simple, implication for sustainability analysis. It shows 
that unconditional thresholds, for example for debt-output ratios, are of little value per se for 
assessing the probability of default. One country may be heavily indebted but have a 
negligible probability of default, while a second may have moderate values of debt ratios 
while running a considerable default risk. Why? Because the joint effects of short maturity, 
political uncertainty, and relatively fixed exchange rates make a liquidity crisis in the latter 
much more likely than a solvency crisis in the former, particularly if the large external debt 
                                                 
3 The analysis employs the data mining software CART developed by Salford Systems. - 5 - 
burden goes together with monetary stability, a large current account surplus, and sound 
public finances. 
 
The plan of the paper is the following. Section II contains a review of the literature. 
Section III describes the dataset. The Binary Recursive Tree methodology is reviewed in 
Section IV, and applied to the data in Section V. Section VI discusses a number of 
refinements, and the main conclusions and policy implications are discussed in Section VII.  
II.   REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The literature on sovereign debt crises falls into four broad categories: (i) theoretical models 
of sovereign debt and default; (ii) empirical studies of the determinants of debt crisis; 
(iii) empirical studies of the predictive power of credit ratings; and (iv) empirical studies of 
the determination of sovereign spreads. Most studies focus on a particular aspect of debt 
crises or particular determinants of default. This literature suggests a number of 
macroeconomic and other factors that influence the likelihood of sovereign debt servicing 
difficulties and default. 
The theoretical literature highlights a variety of factors that can trigger sovereign default and 
debt crises. Thus, we briefly overview in this section what the literature suggests about which 
factors affect the likelihood of a debt crisis. On the one side, countries may be unwilling to 
repay their debt, based on a consideration of the relative costs and benefits of default. On the 
other side, countries may be unable to repay their debt because they are either insolvent or 
illiquid. In empirical applications, a host of macroeconomic and institutional variables have 
thus been used to assess willingness to pay, ability to pay and debt servicing difficulties 
caused by illiquidity.  
Starting with the ability to pay, whether a sovereign is insolvent or not depends on its stock 
of debt relative to its ability to pay, measured, for example, by GDP, exports, or government 
revenues.
4 A sovereign is solvent, if the discounted value of future primary balances is 
greater or equal to the current net public debt stock. Likewise, a country is solvent, if the 
discounted value of future trade balances exceeds the current stock of net external debt. Flow 
imbalances, such as primary or overall fiscal deficits, or trade and current account 
imbalances matter as persistent flow imbalances lead to an accumulation of debt and are 
inconsistent with the intertemporal budget constraint; at some point primary surplus and trade 
surpluses are necessary to avoid insolvency. So, flow imbalances also affect ability to pay, 
for any given level of existing debt. GDP growth and terms of trade shocks also affect the 
ability to pay. The exchange rate regime and exchange rate misalignment impact these debt 
sustainability considerations because an overvaluation can cause an external imbalance that 
leads to debt accumulation. Moreover, a currency crisis triggered by overvaluation can lead 
                                                 
4 See Roubini (2001) for a recent overview of debt sustainability and solvency; and Eaton and Fernandez (1995) 
for a systematic survey of the literature on sovereign debt. Hemming and Petrie (2002) present an extensive and 
broad discussion of the concept of fiscal vulnerability; the concept includes the failure to avoid excessive 
deficits and debt. The concept of fiscal sustainability is, for example, discussed in Hemming and Chalk (2000). - 6 - 
to severe balance sheet effects if a large part of the debt is in foreign currency; the stock of 
debt can sharply increase in real terms after a large currency crisis.  
Willingness to pay depends on the relative costs of defaulting or continuing to service the 
debt.
5 The main costs of defaulting are loss of access to international capital markets and the 
potential output and trade costs of default. Low output growth does not only affect the ability 
to pay but also the willingness to pay. When growth is low, being cut off from capital 
markets is less costly. Openness can affect the costs of default and thus a country’s 
willingness to default or not; more open economies will lose more from the economic 
disruptions of international trade triggered by default. Measures of macroeconomic policy 
stability, such as low inflation or low money growth, reflect policy credibility and 
predictability and thus influence investors’ risk attitudes towards a country and their 
perceptions of the country’s willingness to pay. Institutional and political factors affect 
policy credibility, as well as a government’s willingness to pursue policies consistent with a 
sustainable debt path. Political regime change may lead to the emergence of a political party 
less committed to service the debt; thus, the nearing of election may trigger investors’ flight 
and increase the likelihood of a crisis. Rule of law and respect of property rights signals that 
a country’s government is more willing to service its debt. 
A debt crisis can also occur if a country is illiquid rather than insolvent.
6 Hence, liquidity 
measures, such as short-term debt over reserves or M2 over reserves, are included in many 
recent models of currency and financial crisis that stress the risk of a liquidity run.
7 Other 
measures of debt servicing needs, such as the external financing gap or the interest burden of 
servicing the debt, may also proxy for liquidity needs and the ability to refinance one’s debts. 
Regarding the definition of a debt crisis, empirical studies use different crisis definitions 
depending on the specific research question and the information available in the data source 
used. A priori, there is no single empirical definition of what should constitute a sovereign 
default or a debt crisis. Some studies compile a list of debt crisis or default from case studies 
and anecdotal evidence (e.g., Beers and Bhatia, 1999; or Beim and Calomiris, 2001). Other 
studies rely on a more quantitative approach. For example, Detragiache and Spilimbergo 
(2001) define a country to be in a debt crisis if the country has arrears on external obligations 
towards commercial creditors in excess of 5 percent of commercial debt outstanding or has a 
rescheduling or restructuring agreement with commercial creditors. This definition does not 
differentiate between sovereign or private sector arrears and/or rescheduling due to data 
limitations. Another problem of this quantitative definition is that it might exclude some 
                                                 
5 See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1990) for a more detailed discussion of willingness to pay and the costs of default. 
Note also that, in general, some variables–such as macroperformance measures and measures of the level and 
volatility of macropolicies-proxy at the same time for both the ability and willingness to pay. 
6 The two concepts, however, are not necessarily independent: for example Jeanne (2000) suggests that the 
inability to borrow at short-term maturities may reflect the government’s perceived solvency risk. 
7 See Roubini and Setser (2004), chapters 2 and 3, for an overview of such models and a study of the role of 
illiquidity factors in recent episodes of debt crisis. - 7 - 
incipient debt crises that were only avoided by large-scale financial support from official 
creditors (IFIs and/or bilateral). A data source that provides uniformly compiled information 
on sovereign default is Standard & Poor’s (2002) that defines a country to be in default as 
long as the sovereign is not current on any of its debt obligation.  
Empirical studies of the determinants of debt crisis are closest in nature to an early warning 
signal model. Factors influencing the probability of a debt crisis occurring are identified by 
means of probit/logit regressions or a signal model. Most studies have focused on the debt 
crisis of the 1980s, but there are also some recent efforts that look at crises occurring in 
the 1990s.
8 Taken together, measures of solvency, such as the debt-to-GDP ratio, and 
measures of liquidity, such as short-term debt over reserves or exports and debt service over 
reserves or exports, are significant explanatory variables in addition to macroeconomic 
controls, such as real growth, inflation, exchange rate overvaluation, and the fiscal balance. 
Reinhart (2002) finds that in 84 percent of the cases in her sample, a debt crisis is preceded 
by a currency crisis. Hence, variables that are well-suited for predicting currency crisis 
should also have some explanatory power in models for sovereign default. Detragiache and 
Spilimbergo (2001) carry out a number of interesting tests. They find that short-term debt, 
debt service, and reserves enter their model separately and the null of equal coefficients is 
rejected. Using ratios such as short-term debt over reserves, therefore, imposes a restriction 
that is not supported by the data. They also find that short-term debt is endogenous to the 
model, as countries find it more and more difficult to borrow long term in the run-up to a 
debt crisis. While most studies use macroeconomic variables only in levels, Catão and Sutton 
(2002) also include measures of volatility in their model. Their model in-sample predictive 
power increases markedly when measures of terms of trade volatility, fiscal policy volatility, 
monetary policy volatility, and exchange rate policy volatility are added to a model 
containing real GDP growth, debt service over exports, net international reserves over debt, 
the fiscal balance, the U.S. interest rate, and the real effective exchange rate. Manasse, 
Roubini, and Schimmelpfenning (2003) estimate a logit model of sovereign debt crisis that 
includes a large set of emerging market economies for the 1970–2002 period; thus, they 
include the sovereign crises of the last decade in their sample. They identify macroeconomic 
variables reflecting both insolvency, illiquidity and other domestic and external 
macroeconomic factors that predict a debt crisis episode one year in advance. Their model 
predicts about three quarters of all crises entries while sending few false alarms. 
Taken together, the existing literature suggests several factors that are at the core of an 
empirical model attempting to predict sovereign default: 
Measures of solvency, such as public and external debt relative to the capacity to pay. 
Liquidity measures such as short-term external debt and external debt service, possibly as a 
ratio of foreign reserves or exports. Political, institutional and other variables capturing a 
country’s willingness to pay. Macroeconomic variables such as real growth, inflation, 
exchange rate, etc., capturing both ability to pay and willingness to pay. Measures of external 
                                                 
8 See for example Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001) for a study including recent episodes. - 8 - 
volatility and volatility in economic policies. We, thus, use these various variables and 
measures in the empirical study in this paper. 
While the tree methodology used in this paper has been used in a limited number of 
economic studies and even applied to the case of currency crises (see Ghosh and 
Ghosh, 2002, and Frankel and Wei, 2004 ) no previous study has used this methodology to 
assess the determinants of sovereign crises and to predict them. 
A.   The Data 
The full dataset includes annual information on 47 economies with market access from 1970  
to 2002 (Table 1).
9 The debt crisis indicator is derived from data provided by Standard & 
Poor’s and data on IMF lending. Data on external debt and public debt is taken from the 
World Bank’s Global Development Finance database (GDF), as well as from IMF sources. 
Data on public finance and other macroeconomic variables are taken from the IMF’s World 
Economic Outlook database, as well as the Government Finance Statistics database (GFS).  
A country is defined to be in a debt crisis if it is classified as being in default by Standard & 
Poor’s or if it receives a large nonconcessional IMF loan defined as access in excess of 
100 percent of quota. Standard & Poor’s rates sovereign issuers in default, if a government 
fails to meet principal or interest payment on external obligation on due date (including 
exchange offers, debt equity swaps, and buy back for cash). A potential problem with this 
information is that it may not capture near-defaults or coercive debt restructurings that were 
only prevented through an adjustment program and a large financial package from the IMF.
10 
We therefore augment the information obtained from Standard & Poor’s with data on IMF 
nonconcessional lending from the IMF’s Finance Department.
11 We use information on the 
loans approved, approval dates and the actual disbursement of the loans. Based on the 
information on IMF lending, a country is classified as being in debt crisis if a large 
nonconcessional loan is approved and a disbursement under this loan is actually made in the 
first year. The definition of debt crisis thus encompasses actual defaults on debt recorded by 
Standard & Poor’s and “incipient” defaults that were avoided only through a large scale 
financial support from the IMF. Based on this definition, a country can be in debt crisis for 
an extended period of time. We define a large IMF loan as being in excess of 100 percent of 
quota; this threshold selects the top 10 percent of loans when ranked by the loan to quota 
ratio.  
                                                 
9 For transition economies, the sample period is 1995–2002. Not every variable is available for all countries or 
for the full-time period. 
10 Recent examples of near-default avoided via a large IMF package are Mexico in 1995, Brazil in 1998 
and 2001, and Turkey in 2000. 
11 Mainly lending via Stand By Arrangements (SBA) and Extend Fund Facilities (EFF).   - 9 - 
Table 1. Countries and Default Episodes in the Full Sample 
 Number  Average  Years 
  of Crisis  Length  in Crisis 
Crisis Episodes (entry–exit) 
Algeria 1  6.0 6 1991–97
Argentina 3  5.0 15 1982–94, 1995–96, 2001– 
Bolivia 2  6.5 13 1980–85, 1986–94 
Brazil 3  5.3 16 1983–95, 1998–00, 2001– 
Chile 1  8.0 8 1983–91
China 0  … 0
Colombia 0  … 0
Costa Rica  1  10. 10 1981–91
Cyprus 0  … 0
Czech Republic 1/  0  … 0
Dominican Republic 1  22. 22 1981–
Ecuador 2  8.0 16 1982–96, 1999–01 
Egypt 1  1.0 1 1984–85
El Salvador 1  16. 16 1981–97
Estonia 1/  0  … 0
Guatemala 1  1.0 1 1986–87
Hungary 1/  0  … 0
India 0  … 0
Indonesia 2  2.5 5 1997–01, 2002– 
Israel 0  … 0
Jamaica 3  4.7 14 1978–80, 1981–86, 1987–94
Jordan 1  5.0 5 1989–94
Kazakhstan 1/  0  … 0
Korea, Rep. of  2  2.0 4 1980–82, 1997–99 
Latvia 1/  0  … 0
Lithuania  1/  0  … 0
Malaysia 0  … 0
Mexico 2  5.0 10 1982–91, 1995–96 
Morocco 2  3.0 6 1983–84, 1986–91 
Oman 0  … 0
Pakistan 1  2.0 2 1998–00
Panama 1  14. 14 1983–97
Paraguay 1  7.0 7 1986–93
Peru 3  6.3 19 1976–77, 1978–81, 1983–98
Philippines 1  10. 10 1983–93
Poland 1/  0  … 0
Romania 1/  0  … 0
Russia 1/  1  3.0 3 1998–01
Slovak Republic 1/  0  … 0
South Africa  4  1.8 7 1976–78, 1985–88, 1989–90, 1993–94
Thailand 2  1.0 2 1981–82, 1997–98 
Trinidad and Tobago 1  2.0 2 1988–90
Tunisia 1  1.0 1 1991–92
Turkey 2  3.5 7 1978–83, 2000–02 
Ukraine 1/  1  3.0 3 1998–01
Uruguay 3  2.0 6 1983–86, 1987–88, 1990–92
Venezuela 3  3.3 10 1983–89, 1990–91, 1995–98
Total 54  5.5 
26
1  
Sources: IMF, Standard & Poor’s, World Bank, and authors’ calculations. 
1/ Transition economy countries are included only from 1995 onwards.   - 10 - 
 
B.   Descriptive Statistics 
The explanatory variables can be grouped into three sets: (i) macroeconomic fundamentals; 
(ii) variability indicators; and (iii) political economy variables. As to the former, we use 
various measures of external debt and public debt, measures of solvency and liquidity, 
regressors included in the IMF’s early warning signals model of currency crises as there is a 
possible link between currency crisis and sovereign debt crisis, other macroeconomic 
variables, as well as fiscal flow variables. Table 2 gives the respective mean of the 
macroeconomic variables used in the analysis, distinguishing between full sample, no crisis 
episodes, years before a country enters a debt crisis, in-crisis years, and years before a 
country exits a crisis. In general, the path of means from no crisis to entry into crisis and 
finally exit from crisis is as expected. 
The various measures of external debt (including debt servicing) are relatively low in no 
crisis years followed by another no crisis year. They increase in the year before crisis entry, 
and most measures increase even further within crisis. The measures drop again in the year 
before a country exits from crisis, though they are still higher than before the crisis. The 
measures of public external debt follow the same pattern, suggesting that public external debt 
is a possible driving force behind external debt developments (as in many countries a large 
fraction of external debt is public external debt). 
The macroeconomic variables—including those from the IMF’s currency crisis EWS—
indicate a worsening of the macroeconomic situation in the run-up to a crisis and within a 
crisis, and an improvement in the situation when exiting from crisis. For example, the current 
account deficit increases in the year immediately preceding a crisis entry, stabilizes within 
the crisis, and improves further in the year before exiting a crisis. Real growth falters in the 
year before crisis entry while inflation spikes. The overall fiscal balance, as well as primary 
balance, deteriorate in the run-up to crisis. It is interesting to note that both the LIBOR as 
well as the U.S. treasury bill rate increase in years preceding a crisis, suggesting that tight 
monetary conditions in the G-7 area may reduce capital flows to emerging market economies 
and thus contribute to debt servicing difficulties (as it happened in 1982 for example). 
The second set of variables are measures of volatility. We show in Table 2 the coefficient of 
variation calculated over a moving window of four years, for the surplus/GDP ratio, inflation, 
nominal and real exchange rate and the terms of trade. Interestingly, the volatilities of the 
real exchange rate and of inflation rise in the wake of a crisis, and again in the midst of a 
crisis, while falling on the verge of the exit.  
Finally, political economy variables are shown in the bottom part of the table. The indexes of 
political rights, civil liberties and freedom status, compiled by Freedom House (2002) take 
value on a scale from one (most “free”) to seven (least “free”). There seems to be no 
significant difference between in/out crises episodes. The same applies to the political 
constraint indexes (Henisz, 2000). These measure the number of player in the political arena 
with veto power, who can block reforms. They range from zero (no veto players) to one 
(impossible to reform the status quo). Again, there seems to be little difference between in   - 11 - 
 
and out crisis episodes. The same applies to the typology of electoral systems. The most 
frequent electoral system across all cases turns out to be the number one, proportional 
representation. More action seems to stem from the number of years to next presidential 
election: entry and staying in crisis are on average associated with upcoming elections, 
possibly indicating that political uncertainty before elections plays a role in contributing to 
crises. 
III.   METHODOLOGY
12  
This section describes the Binary Recursive Tree methodology (BRT) for classification and 
prediction. This methodology has been applied to several fields, including engineering, 
medical diagnosis, genetics, meteorology, marketing, insurance, consumer credit. Topics 
have included market segmentation, credit risk assessment, quality control, spread of cancer, 
blood cell classification, infant mortality, wildlife management, air pollution alerts, speech 
recognition, and classification of radar images for the military. Developed by statisticians 
Breiman, Friedman, Olshen, and Stone (1984), it searches for patterns and relationships in 
the data, and is particularly suited for uncovering hidden nonlinear structures and variable 
interactions in complex datasets. “Complexity” includes considerations such as: high 
dimensionality, a mixture of data types, nonstandard data structure and, perhaps more 
challenging, nonhomogeneity, i.e., different relationships between variables hold in different 
parts of the measurement space (Breiman and others, 1984). 
  
The process is binary because parent nodes (partitions) are always split into exactly two child 
nodes, and recursive because the process can be repeated by treating each child node as a 
parent. The key elements of a BRT analysis are a set of rules for: (i) splitting each node into 
two child nodes; (ii) deciding when to stop growing the tree; and (iii) assigning each terminal 
node to a class outcome (e.g., crisis vs. noncrisis). 
 
To split a node into two child nodes, BRT always asks questions that have a “yes” or “no” 
answer. For example, the question for assessing the likelihood of a default on a consumer 
loan might be: his age ≤ 35? BRT’s method is to look at all possible splits for all variables 
included in the analysis. For example, in a dataset containing 2,000 individuals and 
50 observed characteristics, such as a credit score record, age, sex, education, income etc., 
BRT considers up to 2000 times 50 splits for a total of 100,000 possible splits.  
The next activity is to rank order each splitting rule on the basis of a quality-of-split criterion. 
The default criterion, the Gini rule, essentially measures of how well the splitting rule 
separates the classes contained in the parent node and produces a more homogeneous 
subnodes. Once a “best” split is found for a node, BRT repeats the search process for each 
child node, continuing recursively until further splitting is impossible or stopped. Splitting is 
impossible if only one case remains in a particular node or if all the cases in that node are 
exact copies of each other (on predictor variables). 
                                                 
12 The next two sections draw from http://www.salford-systems.com/ and from Breiman and others (1984).   - 12 - 
 
Sources: IMF, Standard & Poor’s, World Bank, and authors calculations. 
1/ Mode of electoral system. 
2/ Excludes Turkey. 
Table 2. Mean of Variables Used in the Analysis 
                    
Current year  All  No crisis  No crisis Crisis  Crisis No.  of 
Next year  All  No crisis  Crisis Crisis  No  crisis  Obs. 
 
Total external debt over GDP 45.5  37.0  54.7  71.4  63.7  1,051 
Total external debt over exports 290.7  239.3  359.3  455.9  350.2  1,053 
Total debt service over GDP             
Total debt service over reserves             
Short-term external debt (RM, over GDP)  10.9  9.4  15.0  15.1  15.7  993 
Short-term external debt (RM, over reserves)  1.7  1.2  2.9  2.9  2.2  948 
Interest on short-term external debt over GDP  0.5  0.5  0.8  0.6  0.7  754 
Interest on short-term external debt over reserves  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.1  754 
Debt service on short-term external debt over GDP  5.3  4.8  6.9  6.4  7.1  1,050 
Debt service on short-term external debt over reserves  0.8  0.7  1.5  1.2  0.9  1,050 
Public external debt over GDP 32.2  25.5  36.4  53.0  46.5  1,051 
Public external debt over revenue 1.7  1.3  1.9  3.0  2.3  827 
Consolidated central government debt  47.5  46.4  38.2  57.3  54.0  462 
Overvaluation 0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.1  0.0  799 
Current account balance  -2.7  -2.7  -4.3  -2.6  -1.3  1,231 
Reserves growth  19.1  20.8  -5.4  17.8  22.9  1,155 
Export growth  12.0  13.8  4.9  6.4  7.8  1,270 
M2 over reserves  5.6  5.3 7.9  6.2  6.2  1,185 
Financing requirement  1.6 1.3  3.0  2.4  1.4  986 
LIBOR 9.7  9.5  10.5  10.5  9.4  1,229 
U.S. treasury bill rate  6.4 6.3  7.8  6.9  6.3  1,229 
Inflation 54.6  17.5  241.1 169.6  84.9  1,273 
Nominal GDP growth  55.9 22.8  249.4  148.6  96.0  1,276 
Real GDP growth  4.1  4.8  1.8  2.1  2.2  1,276 
REER  growth  121.5  124.3 139.7  111.0  109.4 937 
Import growth  10.0  12.3  5.3  4.8  6.9  902 
FDI over GDP  1.7  1.9 1.1  1.0  1.5  1,024 
Openness 71.2  71.3  64.1  72.1  72.5  903 
Overall balance  -4.3  -4.4  -6.3  -3.8  -4.1  1,013 
Primary balance  0.6  0.3  -0.9  2.0  1.5  616 
Primary gap  6.6  5.7  23.1  59.0  -15.0  122 
G.Gov revenue over GDP  24.3 25.4  22.7  20.1  24.2  1,013 
Overall Balance/GDP variability  1.92  -2.53            -1.77  19.42  -1.70 
 
824 
Inflation variability  120.43  10.80  125.37  549.81  83.03       1,082 
Exchange rate variability 2/ 57.8  56.38  45.62  39.87  159.9  1,059 
Real Exchange Rate Variability  2.87  1.49  3.76  6.34  3.39  753 
Terms of trade variability 2.24  2.28  2.32  2.23  1.33  1,088 
Index of political rights 3.52  3.63  3.44  3.18  3.20  1,130 
Index of civil liberties  3.77  3.85  3.75  3.44  3.65  1,130 
Index of freedom status  1.21 1.16  1.21  1.39  1.39  1,130 
Index of political constraints III  0.24  0.24  0.23  0.26  0.31  1,229 
Index of political constraints V  0.35  0.33  0.35  0.37  0.43  1,229 
Year of parliamentary elections 0.19  0.18  0.24  0.23  0.20  1,276 
Year of presidential elections 0.09  0.06  0.11  0.18  0.15  1,276 
Year of parliamentary or presidential elections  0.21  0.20 0.24  0.27  0.24  1,276 
Years to next parliamentary elections 2.73  2.94  2.67 2.06  2.16  1,071 
Years to next presidential elections          5.02               6.47                3.15            2.18                  2.39             660 
Years since parliamentary wlections          2.02               1.81                2.47            2.60                  2.00             901 
Years since presidential elections          2.19               2.15                2.83            2.24                  1.60             418 
Electoral system 1/               1                    1                    1                1                         1          1,210   - 13 - 
 
When does the growing process stops? At each node, the algorithm calculates the gain from 
further splitting in terms of the reduction in the rate of misclassification. This is simply 
the percentage of type i≠j observations that are erroneously classified as type j. This number 
is compared to the cost of further splitting (proportional to the number of nodes in the tree). 
If costs exceed benefits, the process stops.
13  
Once a terminal node is found we must decide how to classify all cases falling within it. One 
simple criterion is the plurality rule: the group with the greatest representation determines the 
class assignment. The rules of class assignment can be modified from simple plurality to 
account for the costs of making a mistake in classification, to adjust for priors,  and to adjust 
for over- or under-sampling from certain classes. These concepts are made more precise in 
the Appendix. There we also discuss an instructive early medical application of the technique 
for classifying patients suffering from heart attacks.  
 
Properties 
The BRT can be thought as a way to let the data select interaction dummy-variables with 
endogenous threshold values (e.g., age≤55 and sex=female). It displays a number of 
interesting properties. First, it is well suited for discovering context dependence, interactions 
and heterogeneity. Datasets with a “complex” structure are easily handled. Unlike parametric 
models, which are intended to uncover a single dominant structure in data, BRT is designed 
to work with data that might have multiple structures, in the sense that different relationships 
hold in different parts of the dataset. The methodology is therefore robust to the effects of 
outliers. Outliers among the independent variables generally do not affect BRT because splits 
usually occur at nonoutlier values. Outliers are often separated into nodes where they no 
longer affect the rest of the tree. This feature is particularly useful when dealing with 
emerging markets, where, particularly in crisis times, variables such as inflation and 
exchange rate depreciation take extraordinary values. Second, no model-specification search 
is necessary. BRT consider any number of candidate variable, and selects the relevant ones 
and their split values. This feature is also useful, when theory does not precisely identify the 
variable to be used (should short-term debt over GDP, export, reserves, total debt, etc., be 
used as an indicator of liquidity constraints?). Third, the procedure is nonparametric, as it 
does not require specification of a functional form for the exogenous variables.
14 In 
particular, results are invariant with respect to monotone transformations of the independent 
                                                 
13 The CART (Classification and Regression Tree) algorithm is actually more sophisticated than that, as it does 
not stop in the middle of the tree-growing process: there might still be important information to be discovered 
by drilling down several more levels. Hence, first a maximal tree is grown and a set of subtrees are derived from 
it, by “pruning” branches backward. The best tree is determined by looking for the tree whose misclassification 
(net) error rates is lowest.  
14 Since the procedure is nonparametric and free from assumptions on probability distributions, no confidence 
intervals can be meaningfully attached to the threshold values. What can be done, however, is to estimate a logit 
model with dummy variables corresponding to node inequalities, on the right side, and to test for their 
significance. Results, generally confirming statistical significance of node dummies, are available upon request 
from the authors.   - 14 - 
 
variables. Fourth, the methodology can deal with cases where the class structure depends on 
combinations of variables, since it allows for searching linear combination of splits. Fifth, 
missing values for predictors are handled very effectively. For each split in the tree, BRT 
develops alternative splits (surrogates), that is, variables that produce a similar allocation of 
observations in child nodes. These variables are used when the primary splitting variable is 
missing. Thus, a missing value does not imply that all the observations on a particular case 
need to be thrown away, as in regression analysis. The missing value is replaced by the best 
surrogate. BRT can be, therefore, effectively used with data that have a large fraction of 
missing values, as often is the case, for example, with fiscal data for developing countries . 
Finally, the algorithm is designed to avoid “over fitting” the model to the data, so that 
predictions remain accurate when applied to fresh data. When the data are insufficient for 
having a separate test sample, BRT proceeds by dividing the sample into 10 roughly-equal 
parts, each containing a similar distribution for the dependent variable. BRT takes the first 
nine parts of the data, constructs the largest possible tree, and uses the remaining 1/10 of the 
data to obtain initial estimates of the misclassification error rate of selected subtrees. The 
same process is then repeated (growing the largest possible tree) on another 9/10 of the data 
while using a different 1/10 part as the test sample. The process continues until each part of 
the data has been held in reserve one time as a test sample. The results of the ten mini-test 
samples are then combined. This procedure, called cross-validation, implies the procedure 
has a built-in capability of performing well on completely fresh data, even in the absence of 
an independent test sample.  
  
The procedure has also a few shortcomings. First, unlike regression or probit/logit analysis, 
the individual marginal contribution of each variable to the probability of belonging to a 
class cannot be ascertained. This is because, unlike regression or probit/logit analysis, BRT 
assign a single probability to all cases belonging to the same node. Second, the procedure is 
not well suited to uncover “general” relationships that hold across the whole sample. As 
pattern discovery become progressively more local, sample-wide information is not used. 
The existence of a linear relationship between the target y and the predictor x would show up 
as multiple splits for variable x being selected consecutively.
15 Third, if  one variable slightly 
outperforms another as a split, the latter may never appear in the final tree, despite being 
possibly more closely associated with class membership than other variables appearing  
down in the tree. Thus, one may incorrectly deduct that the omitted variable is not 
“important.” This problem (“masking”) is somewhat akin to having two significant predictor 
that happen to be strongly collinear. One drops out from the regression. The consequence for 
classification is that the variables appearing in a tree may be sensitive to changes in the 
sample or in the a priori distribution. A way out is to rank each variable by looking at the 
potential effect of the variable on classification, i.e., explicitly accounting for its ability to 
classify observations even when “masked” by the first-choice split. This produces a measure 
                                                 
15 Related to this is the criticism that the procedure is only “one-step” optimal and not “overall” optimal. For 
example, suppose that the procedure produces a tree with ten terminal nodes. If one could search all possible 
partitions of the dataset in ten terminal nodes for the one partition that minimizes the sum of node “impurities” 
(see Appendix), the two result may be quite different (Breiman and others, 1984).   - 15 - 
 
(“importance”) that is “robust” to changes in the sample or in the a priori distribution of 
crises (Section VIII).  
IV.   THE EMPIRICAL TREE 
The BRT methodology selects the following 10 variables out of the 50 candidates listed in 
Table 2: total external debt in percent of GDP; short-term debt on a remaining maturity basis 
to foreign reserves; public external debt to government revenue; real GDP growth; inflation; 
the U.S. treasury bill rate; exchange rate overvaluation; exchange rate volatility; the ratio of 




The first rule splits the sample into two branches (Figure 1): (i) episodes with high external 
debt (more than 49.7 percent of GDP) go to the right—here the conditional crisis probability 
rises from 20.5 percent in the entire sample to 45.4 percent; and (ii) episodes with low 
external debt to the left—with default probability of 9.7 percent. Episodes of high debt (more 
than 49.7 percent of GDP) are further split into high/low inflation (larger/smaller than 
10.5 percent). The former incur the largest default risk, 66.8 percent: see terminal node 14. 
More than half of all the crisis episodes in the sample satisfy these two simple conditions. 
For example, the high external debt plus high inflation criterion was met one year ahead of 
the crises in Jamaica, Egypt, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Uruguay, Indonesia, Bolivia, Morocco, 
Turkey, South Africa, Uruguay, Brazil, and Venezuela. Terminal node 7 is second in terms 
of number of crisis episodes. Despite intermediate external debt levels (between 49.7 percent 
and 19 percent of GDP), the joint effect of short-term debt (exceeding 130 percent  of 
reserves), relatively rigid exchange rates (low volatility) and political uncertainty (less than 
five years to the next presidential elections), conjure to raise the crisis probability to 
41 percent.  
 
By contrast, going down to the left towards terminal node 3, one finds that  the circumstances 
that are more favorable for reducing risks are low external debt, low short-term debt to 
reserves on a remaining maturity basis (below 130 percent) and low public external debt to 
revenue (below 210 percent), coupled with the economy not being in recession. Under these 
circumstances, the likelihood of being in a crisis episode is just 2.3 percent. About 
58.4 percent of all noncrisis episodes satisfy these conditions. 
 
Based on the set of rules of this tree, the observations can be classified as crisis-prone or not 
crisis-prone. Observations in a particular node are classified as crisis-prone (not crisis-prone), 
if the within node share of crisis observations is higher (lower) than in the total sample. In 
our case, since we attach a large cost to missing crisis (see previous footnote), the critical 
                                                 
16 This classification tree was obtained with the following specifications: (i) the chosen criterion to be 
minimized is the Gini index, discussed in the Appendix; (ii) the a priori distribution of crises is taken to be 
equal to the sample distribution; and (iii) the cost of missing a crisis is set seven times as large as the cost of 
missing a noncrisis.   - 16 - 
 
threshold for classifying a node as “crisis” prone turns out to be 11 percent, that is below the 
proportion of crises in the sample 20.5 percent (see Appendix II in Manasse, Roubini, and 
Schimmelpfennig, 2003). As can be seen from Table 3, Column 4, any threshold between 
2.3 percent and 40 percent would not affect our classification. 
 
The tree has one particularly important implication for sustainability analysis. It shows that 
unconditional thresholds for debt output ratios are of little value per se for assessing the 
probability of default. Take nodes 7 and 11. The former has only moderate values of debt 
ratio, between 49.7 percent and 19 percent, but the probability of a crisis is high, 41 percent. 
The latter has a debt ratio of at least 49.7 percent, but the crisis probability is just 2 percent. 
Why? Clearly, other factors are at play. What makes node 7 risky is the compound effect of 
short maturity of the debt, political uncertainty and relatively fixed exchange rates. What 
makes node 11 safe, despite the large debt burden, is monetary stability, a large current 
account surplus, and relatively large fiscal revenues that guaranteed solvency on public debt. 
 
An application to Colombia 
One advantage of our approach is that it can be immediately applied for evaluating default in 
risks. Take the case of Colombia, 2004 (Arias, 2004). One may start asking:  
 
•  “Does total external debt exceed 49.7 percent  of GDP?” Since the answer is “no” (its 
value is 48.6 percent), one moves down to the left and asks: 
•  “Is short-term debt over reserves above 130 percent?” Again, the answer is “no” (its 
value is 98 percent), and one proceeds to the left. 
•  Then “Is public external debt above 215 percent of revenue?,” the answer is “no” (it 
is 100 percent) and one moves to the left.  
•  “Is the economy growth rate above -5.45?” “Yes” (it is 3.13 percent) and move to the 
right until terminal node 3 is reached. The result is that Colombia in 2004 is not crisis 
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V.   CLASSIFICATION TABLE 
The previous observation suggests an effective way to organize the tree’s information 
(Table 3). The first column shows the terminal node number. The second column reports the 
set of inequalities satisfied by each node’s observations: for example, row 14 of the table 
identifies node 14 containing all the cases (country-year) where total external debt/GDP 
exceeds the threshold of 49.7 percent and inflation exceeds 10.5 percent. Column 3 counts 
the number of observations that satisfy the node criteria: for example, looking at the row 14 
and column 3, 196 (out of the total 1,276) observations satisfy the two inequalities on debt 
and inflation. The fourth column reports the probability of a crisis conditional on the node’s 
inequalities being satisfied (i.e., the within node probability): for example the probability of a 
crisis next year, conditional on external debt and inflation exceeding 49.7 percent and 
10.5 percent, respectively, is 66.9 percent. This probability is calculated as the ratio of crisis 
episodes in the node over the total number of observations in the node. The fifth column 
reports the probability that a crisis episode satisfies the inequalities in the node: for example, 
according to the last row and column 5, 50.2 percent of all debt crises satisfy the debt and 
inflation criteria. This probability is calculated as the ratio between the number of crises in 
the node over the total number of crises in the sample. The sixth column reports the 
probability that a no crisis observation falls in the node: for example, from the row 14, 
column 6, we see that 6.4 percent of no crisis episodes were characterized by large external 
debt and inflation. This entry is calculated as the ratio between the number of no crisis 
episodes in the node and the total number of no crisis episodes in the sample. For nodes 
identified as “crisis nodes” (see last column), this probability can be interpreted as a “type II 
error.” Note, however, that this is an imperfect measure of the “safety” of the node, since a 
node (e.g., node 3) may contain plenty of noncrises just because it contains a lot of 
observations. In order to obtain an index of node “safety,” therefore, we must normalize each 
entry by the ratio of observations in the node over total observations in the sample (divide by 
(607/1276) for node 3). The result is shown in the seventh column of the table. Here we show 
an index that takes value greater than one when the node is “safer” than the overall sample, 
and smaller when it is riskier. The index is perfectly (negatively) correlated with the crisis 
probability of column 4. The eighth column contains the predicted state (crisis=1, no 
crisis=0) based on the classification exercise.  
 
Interpretation 
For interpreting our results, it is useful to regroup the nodes into four blocks, that identify 
four different typologies. Block A can be interpreted as describing the characteristics of the 
“(relatively) safe fundamentals” type: observations in that block are classified as noncrisis-
prone. Blocks B, C, and D identify potential defaulters, which are prone to risks of different 
sort. Observations therein are classified as crisis prone. 
 
“Relatively Safe” Fundamentals, type (A). Nodes 1, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, and 3, in descending order 
of “safety,” show the prerequisites for a relatively risk-free environment. Low total external 
debt (below 49.7 percent) is the common denominator of these nodes (with the exception of 
partition 11). Low short-term debt over reserves (below 130 percent), low public external 
debt over revenue (below 215 percent), low inflation (below 10.5 percent) and not too strong   - 19 - 
 
recession (growth above -5.5 percent) also characterize many (but not all) of these partitions. 
By far the more representative partition is node 3, that contains 607 episodes and 58 percent 
of tranquil nodes. This subset is characterized by low total and short-term debt, low public 
external debt over revenue (below 215 percent) and by not too negative growth (above minus 
5.45 percent). Node 11 comes next in terms of observations. Node 11 shows that low external 
debt is by no means necessary for avoiding a crisis. Despite a large foreign debt, a country 
may still enjoy a relatively safe environment (2 percent crisis probability), provided inflation 
is under control (below 10.5 percent), external financial requirements over reserves are not 
too high (below 140 percent) and public external debt over revenue is not too large (below 
310 percent). Node 3 shows that low external debt is by no means sufficient for avoiding a 
crisis. Despite relatively sound fundamentals as defined in node 3, a number of crises 
followed (see last column, row 3). 
 
The nature of the inequality constraints in the following “crisis prone” nodes suggests an 
intuitive classification into solvency (B), liquidity (C), macroexchange rate (D) risks.  
 
Liquidity Crisis-Prone, type (B) is described by nodes 7 and 10. Despite relatively low or 
intermediate external debt ratios, these episodes share a ratio of short-term debt to reserves in 
excess of 130 percent. This, coupled with political uncertainty (presidential elections in less 
than five years) and fixed exchange rate (low volatility), in node 7, or with tight monetary 
conditions in international capital markets (treasury bill rate above 9.7 percent), in node 10, 
raise the probability of crisis to about 40 percent. Solvency risks of the first type (node 7) 
make up more than one-fifth (20.7 percent) of all debt crisis episodes. 
 
Unsustainable Debt Path (Solvency) Crisis-Prone, type (C) is identified by nodes 5, 12, 13, 
and 14. In all these cases either external debt exceeds 49.7 percent of GDP, or its public 
component exceeds 215 percent of revenues. In partition 14, high total external debt, together 
with inflation above 10.5 percent, raises the likelihood of a crisis from 20.5 percent (entire 
sample) to almost 67 (55) percent. About half of all crises episodes satisfy these 
characteristics (fifth column). Note that the high inflation rate could be here a proxy for fiscal 
problems: inability to reduce deficit may need to monetization of them and seignorage 
financing of them. Node 5 is similar, but a solvency crises (4.2 percent of total) are signaled 
by public, rather than total, external debt and high inflation. In node 13 (12), high external 
debt and high financing external requirement (or fiscal imbalances measured by high public 
external debt over revenue), raise the default probability to 47 percent (40 percent). These 
two nodes jointly account for another 15.7 percent of crises. The large external financing 
need can be partly interpreted as a illiquidity problem: this financing need is high when the 
current account deficit is high and/or when there is a large amount of debt coming due; in 
either case, the country may be illiquid if creditors do not provide new financing and/or do 
not rollover their debt. Thus, crisis episodes in node 13 can be interpreted as cases where a 
country is not necessarily “insolvent” but rather has an unsustainable—and nonfinanceable—
debt path given large stocks of debt and illiquidity measured by large financing needs. 
Finally, the observations in node 1 should be interpreted as outliers: in a few cases (13) 
where the exchange rate was not over appreciated, values of external debt were small and 
there were no liquidity problems, there were no crises despite a strong recession   - 20 - 
 
 
Exchange Rate and Macrocrisis-prone, type (D) A small number of sovereign debt crises 
(1.5 percent) in node 2 appear to be driven by large exchange rate overvaluation (above 
48 percent) and large recession (negative growth below -5 percent). These are the crises of 
El Salvador, 1981–82, Uruguay,1983 (the collapse of the Tablita, the forward-looking 
crawling peg regime of some Southern Cone economies in the early 1980s), and 
Venezuela, 1984.  
 
This classification of crises captures quite well most of the crises of the 1990s. Korea  
(1997), Mexico (1995), Brazil (1998) and (2001), were in the illiquidity node 7; and indeed 
these were typical episodes of a liquidity crisis, not insolvency. Pakistan (1998) was also in 
this node; its debt levels were not excessive but the country was illiquid given large lumpy 
debt servicing payments coming due and its loss of market access. Pakistan was then forced 
to restructure its external sovereign debt as, unlike large more systemic countries, it did not 
receive a large IMF package. Ukraine in 1998 (also in node 7), was a similar case of a 
solvent but illiquid country that was forced coercively to restructure its external debt by 
extending its maturities at below crisis level market rates. Clear insolvency cases in node 14 
were Ecuador (1999), which defaulted on its external debt, Indonesia (2002), with a very 
large debt burden (but it is not illiquid given its restructuring of many external debt claims, 
both public and private), and Turkey (2000) with a very large debt burden. Turkey did not 
default thanks to an exceptional IMF program, but based on this classification was borderline 
insolvent.
17 Russia (1998) and Argentina (1995) appear in the noncrisis prone node 3; so, 
these crises are not well forecast by the tree. In the case of Argentina, the Tequila contagion 
from Mexico in 1994 played an important role as other fundamentals (debt levels and 
deficits) were fine at that time. Russia was not insolvent based on debt levels and external 
flow imbalances (current account deficits) but its failure to make flow fiscal adjustments and 
large capital flight led to default in 1998.
18 Node 13 of unsustainable debt path with possible 
illiquidity included Argentina (2001), which did default, Indonesia (1997), which defaulted 
on many private external debts, and Thailand (1997) that did not default on most external 
debt (only on some private claims), but had severe debt servicing problems in its private 
financial and corporate sectors. So, these are cases of outright insolvency or high illiquidity 
that made the debt path not sustainable/financeable.  
                                                 
17 Given the lack of good data on primary balances, our classification does not capture well cases, such as 
Turkey, where the country would be deemed as insolvent based on a debt level criteria, but may be solvent as it 
is running a very large primary surplus (above 5 percent of GDP currently), that is stabilizing and reducing such 
high debt level. 
18 In principle, we may have included a variable measuring “contagion” effects from crises elsewhere. In 
practice, however, implementation in our context is problematic, since contagion typically occurs within a year, 
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VI.   PREDICTION 
In this section we discuss the prediction accuracy of our classification kit. Table 4 
distinguishes between crisis state and crisis entry, the latter being defined as a crisis state 
preceded by a noncrisis state, and similarly for exits. Given the long persistence of default 
states, we expected more difficulties in predicting entries/exits rather than states. The tree 
performs quite well with respect to standard early warning system models: it correctly 
predicts 82.9 percent of states, 93.9 percent of crisis, and 79.9 percent of noncrisis states; 
moreover, it does even better in predicting crisis entries (88.9 percent) than states, while 
sending a limited number of “false alarms”.  
 
Table 4. Prediction 
 
  Full Sample  1990’s Onwards 
Observations 1276  556 
Number of crisis episodes  261  114 
Number of crisis entry episodes  54  20 
 (In  percent  ) 
Correctly called episodes  82.8  78.8 
Correctly called entries into default  88.9  85.0 
Incorrectly called entries into default  18.5  15.0 
Correctly called exits from default  32.0  35.3 
Incorrectly called exists from default  4.8  64.7 
    
Correctly called default episodes  93.9  89.5 
Correctly called nondefault episodes  79.9  76.0 
    
 
Sources: IMF, Standard & Poor’s, World Bank; and authors’ calculation. 
 
 
VII.   WERE THE 1990S DIFFERENT? 
One common opinion is that, because of growing financial and goods market integration, the 
more recent crises in the last decade are “fundamentally” different from those of the 1980s: 
“capital account” crises rather than traditional “current account” crises. If this were true, our 
characterization of the critical variables, as well as their thresholds, may not be appropriate, 
as it was derived from a sample that goes back to the early 1970s. We ask, therefore, how 
well does our model, based on the entire sample, predict the crises of the 1990s. The second 
column from Table 5 shows that the model is as good as predicting the most recent episodes 
as well as those before 1990.  
 
As we discussed in Section III, BRT is in principle suited for dealing with heterogeneous 
observations: if episodes in the 1990s were systematically different from those in the rest of 
the sample, they would be separated out in some node, and would not affect the rest of the 
classification, unlike traditional regression analysis. Thus, we perform another test. First, we 
check whether the observations from the 1990s fall disproportionately in some node. Second,   - 23 - 
 
we build a classification tree for the more recent period and compare the result with the ones 
already obtained. 
 
Table 5. Distribution of Observations in Nodes, 1990s vs. Full Sample 
 







2 Solvency  0 
3 Safe  0.785689 
4 Safe  0.468327 
5 Solvency  0.710296 
6 Safe  0.882355 
7 Liquidity  1.202039 
8 Safe  1.383694 
9 Safe  0.119377 
10 Liquidity  0 
11 Safe  1.573834 
12 Solvency  1.047987 
13 Solvency  0.976175 
14 Solvency  0.828334 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
We start by calculating the percentage of observations from the 1990s in each node t,  
N(t)1990/N(t), and express it as a ratio of the sample observations from the 1990s, N1990/ N. 
This measure equals one if the node contains observations from the 1990s in the same 
proportion of the whole sample, exceeds one or falls below one if the 1990s are over/under 
represented in the node. The result is shown in Table 4. Solvency crises (nodes 5, 12, 13, 
and 14) appear in similar proportions in the 1990s as in the whole sample. Some liquidity 
crises are over (node 7) and some (10) are under represented, and the same holds for safe 
zone. Our conclusion is that there seem to be no discernible pattern in terms of over/under 
representation of the observation from the 1990s. 
 
Next, we want to compare our “full sample” classification trees with one obtained exploiting 
data only since 1990. This is not a straightforward exercise, however, because of the 
“masking” problem discussed in Section III. This problem implies that the variable 
specification in the optimal tree may be sensitive to small changes in the sample, even if the 
overall classification ability of each variable is approximately constant. Rather than reporting 
a second tree, we calculate a measure of how well each variable does in separating crises 
from noncrises in both classifications. The “variable importance” index discussed in Breiman 
et al (1984), essentially equals the change in the “purity measure” of child nodes with respect 
to the parent node that is obtained by each variable’s split (Appendix).
19 The index, and its 
                                                 
19 Interestingly, both the actual and potential effects of the variable on classification is explicitly accounted for 
in CART, so one variable retains importance (and its ability to classify observations is accounted for) even 
(continued…)   - 24 - 
 
rank, is shown in Table 6 for the classification tree of the full sample, as well for that 
calculated with post-1990 data. The most important variable, the one that produces purest 
child nodes, is normalized to 100. Seven (eight, counting the different short-term debt 
measures) out the ten most important variables for the full sample, also appear in among first 
ten variables in the restricted sample. The correlation coefficient between the two measures is 
0.47, and the rank correlation is 0.61. We conclude that our general tree deals effectively 
with potential sample heterogeneity.  
 
VIII.   OTHER EXTENSIONS 
A number of possible extensions come to mind, some of which we have tried. First, 
following the idea the a “history” of past defaults may bear on the credibility of a sovereign 
and thus affect the default probability (as suggested by Reinhart and others, 2003, in their 
“debt intolerance” hypothesis), we constructed a new variable taking on incremental values 
each time a new default episode occurred. Our indicator of (bad) “reputation” did not affect 
the classification tree.  
 
Finally, one can imagine that the economic fundamentals underlying staying in (out) or 
getting into (out) a crisis may be different. We have repeated the analysis distinguishing four 
different states, staying in/out a crisis, and getting into/exiting from a crisis. So far, this 
approach has not proved particularly effective: in particular, it is not easy to disentangle the 
staying in (out) from the entry (exit) states. This is consistent with the results in Manasse, 
Roubini, and Schimmelpfenning (2003), who find, in a logit model, that most variables 
coefficients for entry (exit) do not differ significantly from those of staying in (out). 
However, some new interesting, albeit, preliminary conclusion seems to emerge for exits and 
entries: exits seem to be  typically associated with (regained) fiscal solvency and floating 
exchange rates, while entries seem to be typically associated with liquidity and monetary  
problems. These preliminary conclusions clearly deserve more research.  
 
 
   
                                                                                                                                                       
when it does not explicitly appears in the classification tree, because masked by the first-choice split (see 
previous discussion and Appendix for details).   - 25 - 
 
Table 6. Variable Importance: Full Sample vs. Post-1990s 
 
 Importance  Rank  Importance  Rank 
 1970–2002  1970–2002  1990–2002  1990–2002 
                            
Tot Ext Debt/GDP  100   1 ExtFinRequir 100  1 
Pub Ext Debt/GDP  88.349   2 ShTermExtDebt/Res(o.mat) 72.56  2 
Tot Ext Debt/Exp  69.352   3 PubExtDev/Res 71.255  3 
Sh TermExtDebt/Res (rem mat)  38.869   4 Inflation 56.891  4 
ShTermExtDebt/Res (orig mat)  34.55   5 ShTermExtDebt/GDP(rem.mat) 54.272 5 
PubExtDev/Res  33.707   6 ShTermExtDebt/GDP(or.mat) 50.347  6 
ShTermExtDebt/GDP(rem.mat)  29.849   7 Pub Ext Debt/GDP  46.717  7 
ExtFinRequir  28.233   8 IntShTermExtDebt/Res 42.618  8 
Nominal GDPGrowth  25.503   9 Nominal GDPGrowth  38.491  9 
Inflation  24.748   10 IntShTermExtDebt/GDP 37.617  10 
ServExtDebt/GDP  24.398   11 ReserveGrowth 37.337  11 
DebtServExtDebt/Res  20.893   12 Openness 31.866  12 
M2/Res  19.728   13 Tot Ext Debt/GDP  23.991  13 
Overall Exch Rate  15.562   14 DebtServiceExtDebt/Res 23.372  14 
US TreasBill Rate  15.479   15 PoliticConstraintIndex 21.737  15 
YearsNextPresElec  14.298   16 FDI/GDP 18.724  16 
IntShTermExtDebt/Res  13.333   17 M2/Reserves 15.777  17 
ResGrowth  11.946   18 Inflation Vol  15.297  18 
DebtServExtDebt/GDP  11.606   19 CurrAcc/GDPY 13.977  19 
Exch Vol  11.434   20 TotExtDebt/Exports 13.709  20 
Inflation Vol  11.329   21 RealExcfRate Vol  13.667  21 
Real GDP growth  8.556   22 ReqAdjPrimBalance 12.249  22 
Revenue/GDP  8.346   23 Civil Libert Index  8.847  23 
Openness  7.786   24 Rev/GDP 6.78  24 
RealEchRateVol  7.573   25 PublicDebt/GDP 6.305  25 
Politic Constr Index V  6.996   26 Libor Rate  5.139  26 
PolitcConstr Index  6.996   27 USTreas Bill Rate  5.139  27 
ExpGrowth  5.975   28 YeardSincePresElect 3.417  28 
FDI/GDPY  5.341   29 Political Rights Index  2.893  29 
Libore RateLIBOR  4.45   30 Freedom Status Index  1.628  30 
Civil Liberty Index  3.466   31 TermsofTrade Vol  1.369  31 
M2 Growth  3.202   32 Overval Exch Rate  1.273  32 
PoliticalRights Index  2.951   33 YearsNextPresElections 0.947  33 
YearsNextParlElect  2.23   34 Exch Rate Vol  0.941  34 
Electoral System  2.211   35 ServExtDebt/GDP 0.66  35 
IntShTermExtDebt/GDP  2.15   36 PrimaryBalance/GDP 0.002  36 
GenGovBal/GDP Volat  1.331   37 Sh ermExtDebt/GDP(rem mat)  0  37 
Res Growth  0.494   38 M2 Growth  0  38 
YearsSincePresElect  0.306   39 RealExchRate Deprec  0  39 
CurrAcc/GDPY  0.097   40 Political Constr Index V  0  40 
YearsSinceParlElect  0   41 ParliamElection Year  0  41 
ReqAdjPrimBalance  0   42 PresidElectYear 0  42 
FreedomStatusIndex  0   43 Parl or Pres ElecYear  0  43 
PrimaryBalance/GDP  0   44 Years NextParlElect  0  44 
RealExchRateDep  0   45 ResGrowth 0  45 
ParlamElectYear  0   46 GenGovBal/GDP Volat  0  46 
TermsofTrade Vol  0   47 Exp Growth Rated  0  47 
PublicDebt/GDP  0   48 RealGDPGrowth 0  48 
PresElectionYear  0   49 YearsSinceParlElect 0  49 
Pres orParlElectionYear  0   50 Eectoral  System  0  50 
Correlation=0.466689            Rank correlation=0.614502     
 
Source: Author’s Calculations.   - 26 - 
 
 
IX.   CONCLUSIONS  
In this paper, we applied a new statistical methodology to the question of understanding 
sovereign debt crises, both in terms of fundamentals that lead to a crisis, and of the factors 
that allow us to predict such crises. This tree technique allows us to derive endogenously the 
most important factors that lead to vulnerability in sovereign debt crises and the thresholds 
that signal greater risk of a crisis.  
 
We find that most debt crises can be classified into three types: i) episodes of insolvency 
(high debt and high inflation) or debt unsustainability due to high debt and illiquidity; ii) 
episodes of illiquidity, where near default is driven by large stocks of short-term liabilities 
relative to foreign reserves; and iii) episodes of macro and exchange rate weaknesses (large 
overvaluation and negative growth shocks). Conversely, a relatively “risk-free” country type 
is described by a handful of economic characteristics: low total external debt relative to 
ability to pay, low short-term debt over foreign reserves, low public external debt over fiscal 
revenue, and an exchange rate that is not excessively overvalued. Political instability and 
tight monetary conditions in international financial markets aggravate liquidity problems. 
The approach suggests that unconditional thresholds—for example, looking at debt to output 
ratios in isolation—are of little value per se for assessing the probability of default; it is the 
particular combination of different types of vulnerability that may lead to a sovereign debt 
crisis. 
 
The predictive power of the tree approach is quite good with very few crises missed or 
mistyped; the model predictive accuracy does not suffer when applied to the post-1990 
experience. However, type II errors (false alarms) are somewhat higher than desirable. The 
tree approach allows us to adjust the relative weights given to type I and type II errors; thus, 
one future challenge is to calibrate the model to reduce false alarms while maintaining a high 
predictive ratio for actual crises.  
 
The tree approach is also very useful both to derive rules of thumb or vulnerability 
thresholds, which may be useful to predict crises early on (an “early warnings signal” 
model), and in deriving policy adjustment paths, which may reduce the likelihood of a crisis 
for countries that may be entering in a danger zone. Thus, ideally, this tool can be used for 
surveillance, crisis prevention, and also crisis resolution. 
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An Application of BRT To Heart Attacks 
 
The following medical application (see Breiman and others, 1984, p.175) illustrates the logic 
of classification trees. The problem is to identify patients who are at risk of dying within 
30 days (High Risks) from among those who have suffered heart attacks and have survived at 
least 24 hours, past admission to the University of California, San Diego Medical Center. 
These patients would be placed on an intensive care unit for constant monitoring, while a 
Low Risk patient could remain on a standard medical unit. The dataset contains medical 
records on 215 patients, of whom 37 (17 percent) died not more than 30 days following the 
heart attack, and 178 (83 percent) who survived. The records comprise 19 measurements of 
each patient, e.g., minimum systolic blood pressure, history of heart attacks, presence of 
tachycardia, concentration of enzymes, sex , age etc.  
The first question that is selected is “Is minimum systolic blood pressure below 91?”.
 20 If the 
answer is “Yes” observations move to the left node. Here we find 20 patients. Note that the 
proportions of survivors and early deaths here have changed dramatically: only six patients 
are survivors (30 percent), while 14 (70 percent) early deaths. Further splitting does not 
improve the classification, so the node is classified as High Risk. If the answer to the 
question is “No” observations move to the right child node, where we find the remaining 195 
patients, among which 172 (88 percent) are survivors, and 12 percent are early deaths. For 
these patients new information is considered. The algorithm picks a new question: “ Is age 
below 62.5 years?” For 104 cases the answer is “Yes,” and these observations move to the 
left, in the relatively “safe” terminal node 2. This contains 102 (98 percent) survivors and 
only 2 early deaths (2 percent). The node is classified as Low Risk. For the remaining 91 
patients aged above 62.5 years, a new question is asked: “Was there sinus tachycardia 
present?” (Footnote 13). For 28 observations the answer is “Yes,” and these move to the left 
terminal node 3, that contains 28 cases with equal proportions of the two types, and is 
classified as High Risk. The remaining 63 patients go to the right terminal node, which is 
classified as Low Risk, since 89 percent of the cases therein are survivors.  
When the prior distribution of cases is assumed to be equal to the actual sample distribution 
(83 percent of Low, and 17 percent of High Risks), the within node frequencies coincide with 
conditional probabilities. From the tree we can see immediately which types of patient are 
most at risk of early death: those in terminal node 1, displaying systolic pressure below 91 
(the conditional probability of early death is 70 percent) and those in terminal node 3 that, 
even with “good pressure,” are aged more than 62.5 years and present tachycardia (their 
conditional probability of early death is 50 percent).  
                                                 
20 The systolic blood pressure is the maximum blood pressure that occurs with each hart cycle during 
contraction of the left-sided pumping chamber. Sinus tachycardia is defined to be present if the sinus node heart 
rate ever exceeded 100 beats per minute during the first 24 hours following admission to the hospital; the sinus 
node is the normal electrical pacemaker of the heart and is located in the right atrium (Breiman and others, 
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Some Basic Concepts of Binary Classification Trees 
Next, we briefly summarize the basic concepts of BRT (see Breiman and others, 1984, for 
more details). Suppose that observations on variable Y must be classified into j= 1...J classes. 
Let N, Nj, N(t), Nj(t)  represent the number of observations in the sample, the number of 
class-j observations in the sample, the number of observations in node t, the number of class-
j observations in node t. Clearly, N = ∑ jNj  = ∑ t N(t)= ∑ t  ∑ j Nj(t).  
Let πj , j=1...J, denote the a priori distribution for an object to belong to class j. The ratio 
Nj(t)/Nj  denotes the (empirical) probability that an object of class j falls in node t, p(t|j). 
Thus, p(j,t)= πj Nj(t)/Nj   gives the joint probability that an object belongs to class j and falls 
in node t. Then the probability than an observation falls in node t is equal to  p(t)= ∑ j  p(j,t). 
Finally, the conditional probability of observing a class-j individual, given that it has reached 
node t is given by   p(j | t)= p(j,t)/p(t). From the above expressions it follows that   
p(j | t )= [πj Nj(t)/Nj ]/ [ ∑ j πj Nj(t)/Nj ], with  ∑ j p(j | t)=1        (1) 
When the prior distribution is assumed to coincide with the sample distribution, πj = Nj/N , 
p(j | t) simplifies to the frequency of class j in the node, p(j | t)=Nj(t)/N(t).  
Best Split 
At each node different split values are compared on the basis of how pure child nodes are 
produced. Impurity is a (criterion) function φ(.) defined over the p(j | t), such that the node’s 
impurity measure i(t) is 
i(t) = φ( p(1 | t) p(2 | t),..., p(J | t) )         (2) 
The function φ must satisfy three properties: (i) achieve a maximum at point (1/J,...,1/J); 
(ii) achieve its minimum only at points (1,0,...0), (0,1,0,...0), ...(0,0,...1); and (iii) be a 
symmetric function of the p(j | t).  
Suppose that a value s (split) for an explanatory variable sends a proportion of data pR to the 
right and a proportion pL to the left.. Then one can measure the reduction in the impurity as 
∆i(s,t)= i(t) - pR  i(tR)- pL  i(tL)               (3) 
This is the  “goodness of split” criterion. At each node, the best split is the one that 
maximizes ∆i(s,t). The Gini rule is a particular function φ satisfying properties (i)-(iii) : 
G(t) = ∑ j≠i  p (j | t) p (i | t)               (4) 
One interpretation (see Breiman and others, 1984) is in term of classification error. Imagine 
you use the rule that assigns an object selected at random from node  t to class i with 
probability p (i | t). The estimated probability that the item is in effect in class j  is p (j | t).   - 32 -  APPENDIX I 
 
Therefore, the estimated probability of misclassification is G(t).
21 Since G(t) can be written 
as: 
G(t) =( ∑j  p (j | t) )
2 -  ∑j  p
2 (j | t) = 1 -∑ j p
2 (j | t)          (5) 
 it is easy to see that the index has he minimum value of zero if node t contains only one class 




2 ), and reaches a maximum when the node has equally 





Classification and Stopping Rules 
At each node, the observations in node t are assigned to a class j, which is the class with 
greatest within node probability. Thus, the class assignment rule j*(t) is given by: 
if  p (j | t)=maxi p (i | t) then j*(t)=j           (6) 
If the maximum is achieved for two or more different classes, assign j*(t) arbitrarily as any 
one of the maximizing classes.  
For example, in a j=1,2 class problem with uniform prior distribution (1/2,1/2), the criterion 
would be: classify node t as class 1 if N1(t)/ N2(t) > N1/ N2. If the prior was set equal to the 
sample frequency, πj=Nj/N, the criterion would be the majority rule, i.e., classify node t as 
class 1 if N1(t) > N2(t). 
Early methodologies would stop further splitting whenever the reduction on impurity was 
less than a given value, according to the following stopping rule: 
Set a threshold β and declare node t terminal if  
maxs ∆i(s,t)<β         (7) 
The methodology developed by Breiman and others (1984) is more sophisticated: it builds a 
very large tree and then “prunes” it back. For more details on “pruning” see Breiman and 
others (1984). 
Goodness of Fit 
A measure of the probability of misclassification, given that an observation falls into node t 
is given by  
r(t) = 1- maxi p (i | t)                (8) 
Finally, an estimate for the overall misclassification rate R(t) of the tree classifier is given by  
R(t) = ∑ tεT  p(t)r(t)            (9) 
where the summation is over the set of terminal nodes t. 
                                                 
21 The researcher can specify that the cost erroneously classifying object j  for an i type, C(i│j) is different from 
misclassifying object i for j, C(j│i), in which case the expression for the index is:                                             
G(t) = ∑ j≠i C(i│j) p (j | t) p (i | t). 